Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006

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Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006

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Title: Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006
Author(s):
Miller, Banks;
Curry, Bret
Date Created: 2015-05-28
Item Type: article
Keywords: Bush, George W. (George Walker), 1946-
United States Attorney's Office
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
Description: Full text access from Treasures at UT Dallas is restricted to current UTD affiliates.
Abstract: In 2006, the Bush administration directed nine US attorneys to resign. This decision was a partial cause of the attorney general’s departure from the administration, and it prompted investigations and congressional hearings. Seen as largely ad hoc, we argue that theory predicts a more systematic decision-making process. We investigate this empirically and find, consistent with literature on principal-agent theories and bureaucracy, that performance on easily monitored metrics and adverse-selection concerns predict the firings. We explore the implications of these findings for efforts to centralize decision-making in the Department of Justice and to exert political control over US attorneys.
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Link to Related Resource: http://doi.org/10.1086/696858
Persistent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/6226
Bibliographic Citation: Miller, Banks and Brett Curry, "Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006," Journal of Law and Courts 6, no. 2 (Fall 2018): 379-403.
Terms of Use: ©2018 by the Law and Courts Organized Section of the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

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